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Ida Iren Eriksen1 and Hans Olav Melberg2*Abstract
Background: To examine the impact of introducing an electronic prescription system with no copayments on the
number of prescriptions, the size of prescriptions, and the number of visits and phone calls to primary physicians.
Methods: Fixed regression models using monthly data on per capita prescriptions claims and consultations between
2009 and 2013 at the municipality level, before and after the introduction of the electronic prescription system.
Results: The electronic prescription system with no copayment increased the number of prescriptions by between 6.0
and 8.1 %. It decreased the average size of each prescription, but it did not decrease the number of consultations.
Conclusion: The reduced direct and indirect costs of obtaining prescriptions after the introduction of the electronic
prescription system changed the financial incentives facing the patients and physicians. This led to significant changes
in the level and size of prescriptions and illustrates the importance of financial incentives.
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A recurring theme in the literature on physicians’ behav-
iour is the extent to which physicians are influenced by
changes in incentives as opposed to pure medical con-
siderations [1–3]. This article contributes to a subfield
of this debate by examining how patterns of prescription
behaviour are affected by the introduction of an elec-
tronic prescription system, which changed the incentives
facing the physicians and the patients. These effects are
often difficult to analyse because usually the systems are
adopted either voluntarily and gradually or mandatory
for all at a single point in time. With voluntary adoption
the effects cannot be generalised and when all adopt the
change simultaneously it is difficult to control for other
factors that may change at the same time. Using data
from a gradual, but mandatory, introduction of an e-
prescription system in Norwegian municipalities starting
from 2011, it is possible to reduce these problems. The
effect of electronic prescription systems and associated
reimbursement rates is of general interest given that
many countries are still considering how and when to
implement e-prescription systems [4, 5].* Correspondence: h.o.melberg@medisin.uio.no
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tems has often focused on consequences in terms of po-
tentially reducing prescription errors [6–8], the practical
obstacles and experiences of physicians [9], and the ex-
perience of patients [10]. For instance, one study re-
ported a 50 % reduction in the daily time spent on refills
with an electronic prescription system [11]. Reduction in
time, errors and changes in user experience are import-
ant aspects of e-prescription reforms, but the Norwegian
experience also makes it possible to examine how the
introduction of electronic prescription affects the total
number of prescriptions. An electronic prescription sys-
tem will change several of the incentives facing the phy-
sicians and the patients through the direct and indirect
costs associated with prescriptions. Indirectly it will
change costs by reducing the time required to get and
deliver a prescription. Directly, it will change the costs
since a new system is often accompanied by a new fee
structure, with different total payments and changes in the
co-payment rates. This paper estimates the overall net ef-
fect of the new incentives facing the physicians and the pa-
tients after the introduction of a policy reform involving
electronic prescriptions and its new fee structure.
The main hypothesis is that the reform increased the
overall number of prescriptions because the new e-rticle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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Table 1 Total reimbursement rates to physicians for providing
paper based vs. electronic prescriptions and the amount paid
by the state vs. the patient
Paper based
prescriptions (NOK)
Electronic
prescriptions (NOK)
Total State Patient Total State Patient
2008-2009 50 15 35
2009-2010 45 5 40
2010- 2011 50 5 45
2011-2012 50 5 45 50 50 0
2012-2013 54 9 45 54 54 0
2013-2014 55 9 46 55 55 0
Eriksen and Melberg Health Economics Review  (2015) 5:21 Page 2 of 8prescription system reduced the direct and indirect costs
of a prescription for both the patient and the physician.
Before the system was introduced, the direct financial
cost for the patient obtaining a prescription without a
consultation was about 5 Euro while the state paid 1
Euro. After the electronic prescription system was intro-
duced in a municipality, the co-payment for obtaining a
prescription was eliminated. Instead the state reim-
bursed the physician a fixed sum of about 6 Euro for
each prescription they administered. In addition to redu-
cing the financial cost to the patient, the indirect costs
associated with the prescription were reduced since the
patient no longer had to get the paper prescription phys-
ically. This meant that they no longer had to visit the of-
fice in person, nor did the physician have to fax the
prescriptions to the pharmacist. The elimination of the
co-payment would also increase the number of prescrip-
tions if physicians were less conscious of costs reim-
bursed by the authorities as opposed to co-payments
paid by patients.
The second hypothesis is that the physicians decreased
the size of each prescription when the transaction costs
associated with prescriptions were reduced. It was finan-
cially profitable to split large prescriptions into smaller
and more frequent ones because the physicians were
paid per prescription. In the new system more frequent
prescriptions were also easier to justify since the costs to
the patient decreased. Previous research indicates that
the amount of co-payment affects physicians’ prescrip-
tion behaviour [12–14]. More frequent prescriptions
with smaller amounts are also considered safer in terms
of reducing accidents and overdoses.
Thirdly, the electronic prescription system was ex-
pected to reduce the number of consultations, both in
person and over the phone. After the reform, it was in
many cases possible to obtain a prescription by using
forms on the web and email i.e. without directly consult-
ing the physician. The physician would receive a list of
requests electronically and as long as it was deemed
medically acceptable to give the prescription without
further investigations, they only had to click a button to
send the prescriptions. Less time spent on the phone or
in the office giving prescriptions could free up time, and
for this reason it was expected that the number of con-
sultations would drop slightly when electronic prescrip-
tions was introduced.
Norwegian General Practitioners (GPs) work mainly in
privately owned practices with contractual agreements
with the municipality in which they work to provide
medical services [15]. Patients can choose their GP and
can change GP twice a year, which means GPs have to
compete with each other for patients. They are financed
partly through a fee-for-service (about 75 % of total in-
come) and partly through a fixed reimbursement perperson they are responsible for. The fee-for-service pay-
ment is administered through the Electronic Patient
Record (EPR), where the doctor registers an invoice for
every refundable service. The invoice contains a code to
categorise the type of service provided. All the invoices
are transferred to The Norwegian Health Economics Ad-
ministration (HELFO), who is responsible for reimburs-
ing the doctors according to the fee-for-service scheme.
Since 2005 the invoices have been saved in the KHUR-
register owned by HELFO and our analysis is based on
data obtained from this registry. The data contains infor-
mation on the monthly number of claims for different
types of reimbursements from all the physicians in the
428 municipalities in Norway.
The exact amount of the fee for the different services
is negotiated by The Norwegian Medical Association,
The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional
Authorities (KS) and the government, and published in
the standard tariff. They decide both the total amount for
each tariff and the share of the state reimbursement vs.
the patients’ out of pocket payment. Table 1 shows the
total reimbursement rates to the physician for administer-
ing a regular paper-based prescription and an electronic
prescription in the different years, as well as how much of
the total that was paid by the patient and the state.
The e-prescription system was introduced gradually.
The logic behind the introduction was that more densely
populated areas and cities should implement the system
before less densely populated areas around the city-
centres. In that way it would be easier for the areas
around the city-centres to start using e-prescriptions
since the cities around them already had the infrastruc-
ture implemented and tested. When the government in-
troduced e-prescriptions for GPs it was decided that
patients should no longer pay for prescriptions written
outside of doctor visits. Physicians could write prescrip-
tions to patients without seeing them in a consultation if
the patient and the condition the prescription is re-
quested for are unproblematic and well known to the
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ticals for chronic diseases. In this case the patient calls
the doctor’s office with a request, the prescription is pre-
pared, often by the administrative staff, signed by the
doctor, and the patient picks it up in the doctor’s office.
When the prescription was sent by post or fax, the pa-
tient also had to pay an additional administration fee of
about 7 Euro (54 NOK). Through the years, the propor-
tion of the state reimbursement vs. the patients’ out of
pocket payment for this service has varied, but the pa-
tient has had to pay approximately 80 % of the cost of
paper prescriptions written outside of consultations. The
same service is provided also after the introduction of e-
prescriptions, but the patient no longer has to pay the
administration fee.
Method
We use data from monthly reimbursement claims be-
tween 2009 and 2013 to study the effect of the change in
the tariff made after the introduction of electronic pre-
scriptions in Norway. The system of electronic prescrip-
tion was introduced gradually in different municipalities
starting in 2011 (see Fig. 1).
Given the existence of many observations for different
municipalities across time, we used a fixed effects model
to study the effect of the electronic prescription system
[16]. In the model, the dependent variable is the number
of reimbursements per capita (y) in each municipality (i)
for every month in the period between 2009 and Febru-
ary 2013 (t). The number of reimbursement claims is
modelled using a fixed effect for each municipality (αi), a
dummy for the introduction of the electronic prescrip-
tion system in the municipalities (Di,t) and eleven
monthly dummies (Mj), using January as a reference
month. The impact of the prescription system is esti-
mated by the coefficient δ and the effect of the month ofFig. 1 Percentage of all municipalities with electronic
prescription systemsthe year on prescriptions is estimated by βj where j is the
month of the year. Summarising this, the model is given
by the following equation, which is discussed in more
detail below:
yi;t ¼ αi þ δ Di;t þ
Xj¼12
j¼2
βjMj þ εi;t
The number of claims in a municipality may vary for
many reasons, and using a fixed effects model means
that the time-invariant variables that are specific to the
municipality are captured by a separate term for each
municipality [17]. For instance; municipalities with an
older population may have a stable and higher prescrip-
tion rate than municipalities with a younger population.
Similarly, prescription patterns in urban municipalities
may be different than the prescriptions patterns in rural
areas. These types of fixed factors are captured by the
municipal fixed effects in the regression.
In addition to capturing municipal differences, the
fixed effect term also reduces a potential measurement
problem in the dependent variable. The reimbursement
code used for claims related to paper prescriptions is
sometimes also used for other services (long-term sick-
ness leave certificates and requisitions for physical ther-
apy). In contrast, the reimbursement code for electronic
prescriptions is used only for prescriptions. The
dependent variable in the model is the total number of
claims in both the category for electronic and paper
based prescriptions. This aggregate variable includes some
non-prescription based claims that cannot be eliminated
since they are reimbursed using the same code as pre-
scription claims. This means that the dependent variable
could differ between municipalities even if the number
of prescriptions is the same. However, in the fixed effect
model the time-invariant municipal differences in the
level of the other claims are eliminated. For instance, a
municipality with a higher than average level of long-
term sick leaves would have a higher level of claims, but
as long as the high sick leave pattern is a trait of the mu-
nicipality it does not affect the analysis of change associ-
ated with the electronic prescription system in a fixed
effect model. In general, the existence of other influ-
ences does not create a bias as long as they do not sys-
tematically increase or decrease at the same time when
the electronic system for prescriptions is introduced.
Finally the models include two categories of dummy
variables. First, prescription patterns depend on disease
patterns, which have strong and stable seasonal varia-
tions. In order to capture this, the model includes
monthly dummy variables. Second, and most import-
antly, the model includes a dummy for the introduction
of the electronic prescription system. The precise date
for the implementation is based on the month when the
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was initially defined as the first month when the munici-
pality reported at least one reimbursement claim for
electronic prescriptions. However, in practice the system
took some weeks to be fully implemented in the munici-
palities and often one would observe less than ten elec-
tronic prescriptions in the first month of use. Given that
one is interested in the effect of the system after it had
been implemented, and not during the first implementa-
tion month when it may have been used only for a few
days or by a few physicians, we set the dummy for e-
prescription to be one when the municipality reported at
least 50 reimbursement claims for electronic prescrip-
tions. We also tested whether smaller thresholds (“at
least one claim”) or higher thresholds (“at least 100
claims”) changed the results.
To test different aspects of the model we also ran sev-
eral additional regressions. We tested if the effect of the
reform differed depending on whether the municipality
was an early or a late adopter of the reform, whether the
effect became larger the longer the reform had been in
place, and whether the effects also were present after
introducing annual dummies. Finally, the method itself
was tested using a simulation in which the actual dates
of implementing the e-prescription system was replaced
by random draws of assumed interventions at different
dates. In order to believe the method, the results using
the actual dates for the intervention should be different
from the results under the assumption of interventions
at random dates.
Results
Figure 2 shows the growth in the number of electronic
prescriptions, regular reimbursement claims and the
overall number of reimbursements before and after the
introduction of an electronic prescription on a national
basis. Overall more than 17.5 million codes wereFig. 2 Monthly numbers of reimbursed claims at the national level
(total, regular paper based and electronic prescriptions)registered from 2008–2012. The number of electronic
prescriptions has experienced a steady increase and in
2012 more than 1 million electronic prescriptions were
registered.
The average number of prescriptions per capita per
month in Norwegian municipalities between January
2008 and March 2013 was 0.08. This is equivalent to
about one prescription per year for every person. Figure 3
shows the different trends in the number of total reim-
bursement claims per capita for counties that introduced
the e-prescription in 2012 (fully or partially) and those
counties that did not introduce e-prescriptions in 2012.
The numerical results from the fixed effect regression
model of factors affecting the number of prescriptions
are shown in Table 2. Based on the results from this re-
gression, the introduction of an electronic prescription
system is estimated to have increased the overall number
of prescriptions by between 6.1 and 8.0 % depending on
the threshold for when the system was considered to be
fully implemented. The coefficient for the introduction
of an electronic prescription system is statistically sig-
nificant at the 5 % level in all regressions.
Figure 4 shows the number of standardised daily
doses of pharmaceuticals sold in Norway between 2006
and 2012. Despite the increase in the number of pre-
scriptions, there was no equally large increase in the
amount of total pharmaceuticals consumed. Between
January 2012 and 2013 the share of municipalities with
an electronic prescription system increased from 9 to
72 %. At the same time the number of reimbursement
claims for the code used for reimbursing prescriptions
increased by 9.6 %, while the amount of pharmaceuti-
cals sold measured in daily does per capita increased by
0.5 %. Taken together the increase in the number of pre-
scriptions and the stable statistics for daily dosage, indi-
cate a decline in the amount of pharmaceuticals
prescribed in each prescription.Fig. 3 Number of reimbursement claims per capita in counties who
introduced electronic prescriptions in 2012 (fully or partially) and
counties that did not
Table 2 Results from the fixed effect regression model estimating
how the electronic system and other factors affected the number
prescriptions (per capita per month in municipalities, N = 21 419)
Threshold: 1 Threshold: 50 Threshold: 100
E-prescription (Dummy) 0,0060 *** 0,0049 *** 0,0046 ***
February −0,0065 *** −0,0064 *** −0,0064 ***
March 0,0028 *** 0,0020 *** 0,0030 ***
April −0,0035 ** −0,0039 *** −0,0040 ***
May 0,0013 ** 0,0010 * 0,0008
June 0,0039 *** 0,0026 *** 0,0036 ***
July −0,0089 *** −0,0090 *** −0,0090 ***
August −0,0022 *** −0,0023 *** −0,0023 ***
September −0,0030 *** −0,0030 *** −0,0030 ***
October −0,0009 * −0,0010 * −0,0009 *
November 0,0018 ** 0,0018 ** 0,0018 ***
December 0,0003 0,0005 0,0005
Constant term 0,0751 *** 0,0758 *** 0,0760 ***
*** Statistically significant at the 1 % level (**; 5 %, *; 10 %). The different
thresholds represent how many times e-prescriptions have to be used in a
month before the system is considered implemented in the municipality.
Robust estimation of standard errors was used since the Modified Wald test
indicated presence of groupwise heteroscadasticity
Table 3 Fixed effect regression of the per capita monthly
number of daytime phone consultations with patients and
daytime office consultations
Daytime phone
consultations
Daytime office
consultations
Variable Coefficient Standard
Error
Coefficient Standard
Error
E-prescription 0,0028 *** 0,0009 −0,0005 0,0013
February −0,0058 *** 0,0002 −0,0255 *** 0,0009
March −0,0008 ** 0,0004 −0,0058 *** 0,0008
April −0,0127 *** 0,0005 −0,0638 *** 0,0028
May −0,0064 *** 0,0005 −0,0194 *** 0,0010
June −0,0053 *** 0,0005 −0,0154 *** 0,0011
July −0,0266 *** 0,0008 −0,0781 *** 0,0040
August −0,0140 *** 0,0007 −0,0287 *** 0,0017
September −0,0066 *** 0,0007 −0,0014 0,0020
October −0,0031 *** 0,0062 0,0029 * 0,0016
November 0,0017 *** 0,0000 0,0139 *** 0,0016
December −0,0128 *** 0,0006 −0,0308 *** 0,0020
Constant term 0,0773 *** 0,0004 0,2532 *** 0,0011
*** Statistically significant at the 1 % level (**; 5 %, *; 10 %). Robust estimation
of standard errors was used since the Modified Wald test indicated presence
of groupwise heteroscedasticity
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reimbursement for office-based visits to the physician
and phone consultations (not resulting in prescriptions).
There is no evidence of a significant decline either in the
number of office-based consultations or the number of
phone consultations after the introduction of an elec-
tronic prescription system. Instead there seems to have
been a very small, but statistically significant, increase in
the number of phone consultations. There is no statisti-
cally significant change on the number of office consul-
tations associated with the introduction of the electronic
prescription system.Fig. 4 Pharmacautial market, Defined Daily Dose per capita from
2006 to 2012Table 4 shows the key results when the model was ex-
tended. The first extension introduced a dummy for late
adopter which was defined as the municipalities which
introduced the reform after half of the others had done
so. The coefficient for municipalities who adopted the
reforms later than the others (0,0009) was small and not
statistically significant, while the coefficient for the re-
form (0,0047) remained significant. The second model
allowed the effect to grow over time by introducing a
linear trend which increased by one unit every month
after the reform was introduced. The results indicate
that the reform itself was still significant (ie. creating a
shift of 0,0008), but also that the effect grew over time
as people adapted and learned about the new possibil-
ities (with a the coefficient of 0,0006 for every month
the reform had been in place). In the third model with
annual dummies, the effect of the reform was reduced
(0,0008), but remained statistically significant. The an-
nual dummies are correlated with the introduction of
the reform since this happened mainly in 2012 and 2013
and the dummies are also large and significant for these
years (0,0037 and 0,0087).
The results from the thousand regressions each using
randomly drawn dates for the implementation of the
electronic prescription system in each municipality, is
presented in Fig. 5. The coefficients in these regressions
ranged from 0.0005 to 0.0036, compared to the regression
coefficient of 0.0049 in the main analysis when using the
true time period of implementation (threshold 50, Table 2).
Table 4 Key results from regressions testing whether the effect
differed depending on the time of intervention, the length of
time after the intervention, and whether annual dummies
would eliminate the effect (N = 21 419)
Time of intervention
adopters
Time after
intervention
Annual
dummies
E-prescription
(Dummy)
0,0047 *** 0,0008 * 0,0008
( (0,0004)
**
Dummy for
late adopters
0,0009
Linearly
increasing effect
0.0006 ***
Dummy for 2010 −0,0007 **
Dummy for 2011 0,0006 *
Dummy for 2012 0,0037 ***
Dummy for 2013 0,0087 ***
*** Statistically significant at the 1 % level (**; 5 %, *; 10 %)
Eriksen and Melberg Health Economics Review  (2015) 5:21 Page 6 of 8Discussion
In line with the first and second hypotheses, the results
indicate that the new system increased the number of
prescriptions and reduced the average size of each pre-
scription. The third hypothesis, however, was rejected:
The electronic system did not lead to a decrease in the
number of office or phone consultations. There are sev-
eral reasons as to why this did not occur. First of all, the
new system required physicians to contact individuals
asking for an electronic prescription when there were
doubts about the appropriateness of the prescription.
This could lead to more phone consultations, instead of
the reduction that some policy makers expected. Second,
physicians are in high demand and whatever time is
freed up by a new technology is quickly filled with other
tasks and patients.
The results strengthen the small but important litera-
ture on the effect of co-payment on physician behaviour.Fig. 5 Distribution of coefficients for effect of electronic precriptions
in one thousand regression simulations assuming random dates for
the intervention (observed result with true dates marked in red)Several previous results have shown that physicians be-
lieve it is important to consider patients’ costs [18, 19],
and that they also act on this belief in practice [20]. In
the Norwegian case, there was no change in the overall
reimbursement to the physician for each prescription,
but the cost born by the patient decreased. The change
towards more frequent prescriptions is consistent with
the view that physicians pay less attention to the costs
when they are born by the state and not the patient.
Since Norwegian GPs are competing for patients, one
reason for why the number of prescriptions has gone up
might be that it becomes easier for the GPs to offer
more prescriptions. More prescriptions to the patients
might be an advantage in holding on to patients.
The reform had a statistically significant effect on pre-
scriptions in in the extended models, even after the in-
clusion of annual dummies that are partly correlated
with the reform itself. These extensions also revealed
that there was a learning effect: Over time providers
adapted by creating easier web based solutions for pa-
tients, and patients also learned about the lower copay-
ments over time.
While the results show that the number of prescrip-
tions went up, there are several potential limitations and
issues for further studies in the field. First of all, al-
though a fixed-effects model captures time-invariant fac-
tors, it is vulnerable to the effects of time-varying
covariates. For instance, if the reform had been intro-
duced during a recession one might observe a decrease
in the number of prescriptions after the reform, but the
reduction might be more related to the economic
change than the reform itself. Failing to control for in-
come would then lead to the misleading conclusion that
the reform decreased the number of prescriptions. This
is a general limitation with fixed-effect models, but in
our specific case the problem is reduced because the re-
form was introduced at different points in time in differ-
ent municipalities. It is unlikely that income and other
factors would suddenly fall at different points in time in
different municipalities exactly when the electronic pre-
scription system was introduced. Also, the results from
the simulation show that the results cannot be explained
by a general trend over the whole time period since the
regression results from using the true dates was much
larger than all the results from the simulations which as-
sumed interventions at random dates. It should be noted
that the overall positive average effect in these counter-
factual regressions are expected. The test was whether a
random date of implementation would change the re-
sults, and none of the municipalities could start with an
e-prescription system and then leave it. In this sense the
structure of the random draw resembled what happened: as
time passed the municipalities at some point introduced an
electronic prescription system. For this reason there will be
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ference between this positive average and the actual results
received when using the true dates which provide some
confidence that the method in fact picks up a significant
effect.
A second potentially problematic issue is that the new
system changed many different variables and the current
study has only estimated the overall net effect of these
changes. Both direct and indirect costs changed, for both
the physician and the patient. All of this contributed to
the change in the prescription pattern and the data can-
not isolate the separate effect of each change. For in-
stance, the reduction in the co-payment occurred at the
same time the electronic prescription system was intro-
duced. A future line of research would be to gather new
data and try to determine the importance of the various
factors. For instance, to what extent the increase was
caused by the direct change in financial incentives (i.e.
no co-payment for the patient) versus the reduced indir-
ect cost associated with the increased ease of asking for
and approving prescriptions (for both the patient and
the physician). Although it would be useful to distin-
guish between the strength of the different changes, the
overall net effect is still important. Often a change in the
prescription system will logically lead to other changes.
For instance, the change in co-payment was linked to
the introduction of the electronic system because it was
difficult to collect co-payments when the patient did not
have to go to the office to get the prescription. In this
sense the changes are connected and can be evaluated as
a single and logically interrelated reform package.
A third potential problem is that administrative re-
forms may also change reporting habits and procedures.
With an electronic system, it is less likely that a pre-
scription will not be counted and it is easier to split pre-
scriptions into several small parts. It is difficult to
determine the extent of such reporting changes from the
aggregate data, but the change in overall prescriptions is
interesting even if it to some extent reflect reporting
changes as opposed to real changes in prescription be-
haviour. For policy makers deciding whether to imple-
ment these systems, the increased reimbursement costs
associated with more prescriptions are real regardless of
whether the cause is an actual change in prescription be-
haviour or a reporting change. In practice it will be a
combination and to the extent that it is possible to dis-
tinguish between these sources, this would be an inter-
esting topic for further investigation.
Conclusion
The introduction of an electronic prescription system
with no patient co-payment, led to an increase in the
number of reported prescriptions of between 6.1 and
8.0 %. Although the number of prescriptions increased,the dose per prescription decreases so the new system
did not significantly increase the overall consumption of
drugs as measured by average daily dose. Finally, the
new system did not decrease the number of office or
phone consultations reimbursed to physicians.
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